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AVOIDING A DEATH DANCE: ADDING
STEPS TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON THE USE OF FORCE TO IMPROVE
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES TO
FORCE AND PREVENT LIKELY HARMS
Brian J. Foley

*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he world seems engaged in a death dance. In the past
two years we have seen a massive terrorist attack that
targeted New York City and Washington, D.C., and a response
by the United States that included invading Afghanistan and
toppling its government.1 A year and a half later, the U.S. invaded Iraq and toppled its government, based on the argument
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center. J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, A.B., Dartmouth College. I developed these ideas in a paper presented at
the International Symposium on Terrorism and Human Rights, sponsored by
the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, Egypt, January 26–28,
2002; in a draft of this paper to the Faculty of the Rutgers School of Law,
Camden, on September 30, 2002; and in a paper presented at the conference,
US Nuclear Policy and Counterproliferation, sponsored by the Center for Defense Information and Physicians for Social Responsibility, Washington, D.C.,
February 26, 2003. I thank the sponsors of and participants at those conferences as well as the Rutgers Law Faculty, especially Ari Afilalo, Kim Ferzan,
Ann Freedman, Ann Marie Iannone, Darren Latham, Michael Livingston,
Ruth Anne Robbins, Rand Rosenblatt and Ray Solomon. Many thanks also go
to the editors and staff of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, who saw
the need for reform of the laws of war and issued a Call for Papers on this
subject. I also thank Touro Law Center and Widener University School of
Law for their support of this project, and Touro Law student Annette Thompson, who helped with research. I especially thank the following for their review of drafts and earlier versions of this Article, and their encouragement of
these ideas: Kevin Boyle, Roger Clark, Gail Davidson, Bill Foley, S.J., M.D.,
Stephen Friedman, Judith Gardam, Sean Kealy, Charles Knight, Michael
Mandel, Harold Piety, Tamara Piety, John Quigley, Andy Strauss, and most
of all, M.G. Piety.
1. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 41–42 (2002); Battle Without
Borders: The War on Terror, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, at http://www.worldpress.o
rg/specials/wtc/front2.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
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that Iraq posed a direct threat to neighboring nations and an
indirect threat to distant nations, since its government could
potentially supply terrorists with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.2
The wars against Afghanistan and Iraq were either violations
of international law or represented a modification of that law
through state practice, thereby making it easier for all nations
to resort to the use of force.3 Such a modification may be necessary or logical. The world appears increasingly dangerous,
given the possibility that terrorist organizations might repeat
the horrific level of destruction visited upon the U.S. on September 11, 2001, or perhaps inflict even greater damage with
more destructive weapons. On the other hand, if violence begets violence, then we may not be moving toward a peaceful
future but dancing toward the precipice of an abyss of lawlessness and violence. We cannot know for certain whether we are
setting the stage for a more violent or more peaceful world.
However, the presumption in the United Nations Charter and
the customary law of self-defense is against using force.4
International law controls the resort to and use of force, by either the UN or a single nation. The precise nature of this control, however, is vague. This Article implicitly argues for an
understanding of these laws as a three-step process, a clarification that would be a “reform” in and of itself. The three steps
are: (1) whether the situation to be addressed falls within the
category of situations where force is one of the allowable responses; if so, (2) whether force is a necessary response, that is,
2. President George W. Bush, Speech On Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003), CBS NEWS,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/17/iraq/main544377.sh
tml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003); United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair,
Address to the Nation (Mar. 20, 2003) BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2870581.stm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary: By Flouting War Laws, U.S. Invites
Tragedy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at B13 (providing a succinct look at this
danger).
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 51; Alan D. Surchin, Terror and the Law: The
Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, 5 DUKE J.
COMP. INT’L L. 457, 473 (1995); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to
Terrorism, 63 U.PITT. L. REV. 889 (2002) [hereinafter O’Connell, Lawful SelfDefense]; Jack Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense
Under International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 559, 567 (Spring 2002)
[hereinafter Beard, America’s New War].
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whether meaningful alternatives to force exist; and, (3) whether
the force used as a response complies with the norms of military
necessity, proportionality and discrimination. Steps One and
Two can be described as concerns of the jus ad bellum (the law
governing the decision of whether to use force). Step Three contains concerns of the jus in bello (the law regulating how force is
actually used and how hostilities are conducted).
This Article proposes to modify the laws concerning the use of
force by focusing on Steps Two and Three, because these steps
can serve, prospectively, to prevent the automatic and undisciplined use of force in response to a crisis or attack. That is,
once decisionmakers have identified a serious problem that
might be addressed with force (Step One), they still must decide
whether to use force, as opposed to other means. Step Two,
which limits force to when it is “necessary,” implies that a
search for alternatives is required. Yet the law provides little
guidance for such a prospective search. This Article suggests
ways that it can. Of course, it is difficult to “legislate” how
many options a decisionmaker must consider, how thoroughly a
decisionmaker must consider them, and whether the decisionmaker has to think up any options outside of traditional ones.
Nevertheless, to “legislate” such a thinking process is the subject of this Article.
Step Three (jus in bello), which controls how force is actually
used, such as denoting which weapons and targets are legal and
declaring how civilians and prisoners of war are to be treated
during hostilities, protects against many of the harms that can
result. This Article argues, however, that much of this protection comes too late — after the shooting starts.5 Indeed, some of
the “protection” comes only after hostilities end, in the form of
war crimes tribunals.6 Such tribunals do little for those killed,
maimed, orphaned, widowed or psychologically damaged by the
use of force and do nothing to prevent those damages prospec-

5. Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87
AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 404 (1993) [hereinafter Gardam, Proportionality and
Force] (noting that “many of the decisions involving the application of proportionality, “predominately a jus in bello concern,” are “taken at the planning
stage” of military campaigns).
6. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, A Critical History of the Laws of
War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 95 (1994).
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tively. There may be a deterrent effect,7 but prosecution for war
crimes is perhaps the exception rather than the rule, and prosecution is selective. Last, enforcement of the jus in bello is often
left in the hands of the combatants. Prospective consideration
of jus in bello concerns, before the shooting starts, in the way
this Article suggests, could increase international control over
and participation in these protections.
This Article explores how such prospective guidance can be
implemented at the UN as well as on the national level. This
Article also explores how, even without a formal change to the
UN Charter, change could occur as a result of practices and recommended interactions between the Security Council, General
Assembly, International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), nongovernmental organizations (“NGO”), and national leaders.
A. Proactive, “Reforming Attitude” is Necessary for Change
Three phenomena have prevented significant reform of the
laws of war, especially the jus ad bellum: (1) the belief that nations’ resort to war is incapable of regulation; (2) the lack of an
enforcement mechanism in international law; and, (3) the doctrines of custom and state practice, which are descriptive tools
for determining what the law is. A detailed study of these subjects is beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief discussion
shows why proactive reform of the laws should be considered
now. The first, the belief that war cannot be regulated, can be
dismissed readily. Wars are created by human beings, with
identifiable causes, and as such can be regulated.8 Wars do not
usually erupt like fistfights but require planning. Second, under a robust enforcement mechanism, such as an international
court system (or, in the case of the UN, a highly active Security
Council), the legality of particular actions would be clarified. 9
7. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Searching for Peace and
Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9,
18 (1996).
8. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 71 (Oxford
University Press 2d ed. 1994) (1988).
9. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 11–12
(2000). After reviewing a draft of this Article, Judith Gardam opined that
many of the changes I propose would likely have come about if there were an
enforcement mechanism in international law.
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Leaders could look to the law as a guide to avoid negative consequences. Indeed, international law on the use of force would
likely develop in the same way that law has developed over time
in the Anglo-American common law system, adapting to
changed conditions. In such a system, optimistic, would-be reformers might choose not to reform at all, but to wait, believing
that, over time, the law will change and even improve. However, one probably waits in vain for such change where there is
no enforcement mechanism. For example, in the past two
years, the United States has invaded two countries, and the
Security Council, the organ of the UN charged with primary
responsibility for the use of force, has made no pronouncement
on the legality of these wars, despite meeting shortly after each
incident and issuing Resolutions concerning, inter alia, humanitarian aid and provisional government.10 Similarly, the Security
Council has not remarked on several other uses of force since
1945, including the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan; only after seven years did the Council respond to
the Iraq-Iran War of 1980–88.11
Instead, the determination of legality has been left to commentators. This is where the third impediment to reform
arises. Commentators often focus on whether the particular
use of force constitutes state practice or customary law. A pattern has emerged where a nation uses force, and scholars comment post facto on whether such use of force was legal.12 Be10. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1483 (2003); S.C. Res. 1476, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4743d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES1476 (2003); S.C. 1472, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4732d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1472 (2003); S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4443d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001); S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4434th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4415th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1378 (2001).
11. PETER MALANCZUK, AKERHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 391 (1997). The Security Council is not required to act in
any instance, which has led critics to complain of its “notorious selectiveness.”
Id. at 427.
12. See, e.g., Christopher C . Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 77 AM. J. INT’L. L. 131 (1984) (discussing legality of 1983 U.S. invasion of
Grenada); Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 177 (1987) (discussing
legality of 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya); Ved P. Nanda, AGORA: U.S. Forces in
Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activists? 84 AM. J. INT’L. L.
494 (1990) (discussing legality of 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama); John Quig-
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cause state practice and custom are a source of international
law, commentators will often conclude that the exercise of force
was legal. 13 The dangers inherent in such a system are obvious.
A nation that is, so to speak, entrepreneurial in using force
could thus make each use of force sufficiently different from the
previous one, and as such, the legality of the action would always be indeterminate at the time. For example, the country
could attack country A for harboring terrorists; attack country
B for building weapons of mass destruction; attack country C
for repressing its populace; attack country D for encouraging
and assisting rebels or terrorists in a neighboring nation; attack
country E for spreading deadly industrial pollution to neighboring countries; and so on. Of course, there may be roadblocks
along the way to make this slope less slippery, but the potential
for such entrepreneurialism nevertheless exists.
Notwithstanding the doctrines described above, there has, of
course, been reform in international law. But notably, the major reforms have been proactive. Such was the case with the
ley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New
Order or Disorder? 25 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 23–4 (1992) (discussing legality of
1991 Gulf War) [hereinafter Quigley, New Order]; Jules Lobel, The Use of
Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 554 (1999) (discussing legality of 1998 U.S. missile strikes against al Qaeda); Nigel. D. White, The Legality of Bombing in the
Name of Humanity, 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 27 (2000) (discussing legality
of 1999 NATO bombing in former Yugoslavia); O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense,
supra note 4, at 889 (discussing legality of 2001 coalition invasion of Afghanistan); John Quigley, The Afghanistan War and Self-Defense, 37 VALPARAISO U.
L. REV. 541 (2003) (same).
13. GRAY, supra note 9, at 119.
A few of these commentators seem prepared to treat any US action as
a precedent creating new legal justification for the use of force…The
lack of effective action against the USA as a sanction confirms them
in this view. But the vast majority of other states remain firmly attached to a narrow conception of self-defence.
Id.; DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 92–97 (noting that the law does not change so
easily, and that there are indeed instances where the law is simply broken
instead of refashioned). Concerning the doctrine of custom and state practice,
and how it affects the law, see MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 39–48. The
seeming illogic of law-breaking as a source of international law is expressed in
a comment by former U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr, who opined,
“Well, as I understand it, what you’re saying is the only way to change international law is to break it.” John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2000).
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creation of the UN and the International Criminal Court, both
of which have been called “paradigm-shifting.”14 Regarding the
use of force, proactivity and a normative approach are crucial
because, as explained above, without them change appears possible only if nations actually go ahead and use force. Moreover,
proactive reform is necessary given that these laws seek to prevent violence, bloodshed, and misery —“the scourge of war,” as
the UN Charter Preamble states.15
B. This Proposal Fills a Gap in the Scholarship
This Article fills a gap in the scholarship regarding how Steps
Two and Three of the law on the use of force can be applied to
limit the use of force and the damage that results. There is already significant scholarship with respect to Step One, namely
the categorization of situations or events to which force is a legal response. Several commentators argue that the categories
of “threat to” or “breach of international peace and security,”
“aggression,” and “armed attack” should be more precisely defined, or expanded, to include, inter alia, humanitarian intervention, anticipatory self-defense, and responses to terrorism.16
Indeed, a fairly recent proposal to change the jus ad bellum focuses on categorizing which uses of force should be legal and
which should be illegal, essentially collapsing what this Article
argues should be a three-step process into a single step.17 Step
Two has been the subject of commentary that seeks to water
down the requirement of a search for alternatives to force, precisely the opposite of what this Article argues; this commentary
will be addressed infra, in Section III(A)(3). The jus in bello,
the subject of Step Three, has been the focus of intense reform

14. See Roger S. Clark, Rethinking Aggression as a Crime and Formulating
Its Elements: The Final Work-Product of the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859, 868 n.31 (2002) (noting that International Criminal Court represents a “paradigm shift”).
15. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
16. See, e.g., Beard, America’s New War, supra note 4, at 567; Oscar
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1628, 1633 (1984).
17. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 195–202 (1993).
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and scholarly commentary since World War II.18 Yet, the problem in timing as described above persists. The potential of the
jus ad bellum to prevent harm to the interests governed by the
jus in bello has been recognized,19 but precisely how it can do so
has not been explored.20 Its potential remains unfulfilled.
Moreover, this Article comes at a time when a broader recognition is forming within the UN that the law on the use of force
needs reform. The most prominent recent call for reform has
come from UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, who said that
the recent U.S.-U.K. war against Iraq, waged without UN approval or control, should occasion reconsideration of the rules on
the use of force.21
There are several reforms that can be made to international
law concerning the use of force: the composition of the Security
Council could be changed to reflect current realities; the veto
power enjoyed by the Security Council’s Permanent Five Mem18. See generally Joseph L. Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War
and the Urgent Necessity for Their Revision, 45 AM. J. INT’L. L. 37 (1951);
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Laws of War, 29 BRIT.
Y. B. INT’L. L. 360 (1952); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 387,
412–16 (1994); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 49, 95 (1994).
See also Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of TwentyFirst Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict
19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051 (1998) (discussing how the jus in bello will be pressured, and ultimately modified, by technological change) [hereinafter Schmitt,
Bellum]. The primary example of the significant reform of the jus in bello
since World War II are the Geneva Conventions.
19. See Judith Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 285, 301–02 (1996) [hereinafter Gardam,
Legal Restraints] (questioning the separation of the jus ad bellum and the jus
in bello and stating, “It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that to
rely on the jus in bello to provide real protection to the civilian population in
times of armed conflict is a failure to acknowledge the far greater potential of
the jus ad bellum to achieve this goal.”).
20. Michael N. Schmitt, The Resort to Force in International Law: Reflections on Positivist and Contextual Approaches, 37 A. F. L. REV. 105, 107 (1994)
(“By contrast [to the jus in bello], the jus ad bellum, the law which governs
resort to force, is relatively unexplored territory.”).
21. Dharam Shourie, United Nations in Need of Fundamental Reform, at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/02un.htm. See also Press Release, Transcript of Secretary General Kofi Annan Speech to the General Assembly (Sept.
23, 2003), UN Doc. SG/SM/8891, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press
/docs/2003/sgsm8891.doc.htm.
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bers could be eliminated;22 and war crimes could be defined
more clearly, perhaps in the new International Criminal Court.
Many such changes would be welcomed and should be explored.
This Article, however, focuses instead on how the law can be
modified so that it may prospectively guide decisionmakers to
resort to force less often, by requiring decisionmakers to devise
and consider alternatives to force, and by requiring decisionmakers proactively to consider the particular harms that a proposed use of force could cause, and to devise ways to avoid or
limit these harms.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW ON THE USE
OF FORCE (JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO) AS A THREESTEP PROCESS
International law can be read as detailing a three-step process regarding the use of force: (1) the conflict must fall within
one of the categories in which force may be used; (2) there must
be a search for alternatives to force; and, (3) any use of force
must be disciplined and limited. Indeed, much of the reform for
which this Article argues is merely heuristic: recognizing these
three steps can help decisionmakers take a prospective, considered and creative approach to determining whether force should
be authorized. What follows is a reading of the UN Charter,
customary law of self-defense, and agreements such as the Geneva Conventions that reveals this three-step framework.
A. Step One: Does the Problem to be Solved Fall Within a Category Where Force May be a Permissible Response?
Chapter VII of the UN Charter outlines the Security Council’s approach to using force, and it can be read as requiring a
thinking process. First, the Security Council must “determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression.”23 Such threats or breaches are undefined by
the Charter and, presumably, the Security Council has discre-

22. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 376-77, (noting the unwillingness of
permanent members to relinquish their power). Id. at 430 (discussing possibility of reforming UN structure).
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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tion in making such a determination.24 Indeed, it has been argued that the Security Council has no limits in this regard.25
However, this discretion should not be seen as unbounded,
given that the Security Council is required to “act in accordance
with the Purposes and Princples of the United Nations.”26
Thus, Step One is a categorical one: the Security Council
must ask if the event or crisis is a “breach of” or threat to international peace and security,” an “act of aggression,” or an
“armed attack.” In some cases the categories are clear. For example, a military invasion of a country would be a “breach of
international peace and security” and an “armed attack.”27 On
the other hand, the leader of one nation burning the flag of another nation, and shouting insults at that other nation on television, would not fall within such a category, and, as such,
would not occasion the legal use of force as a response. And
then there are gray areas. Is it an “armed attack” when foreign
men steer civilian passenger planes into a military headquarters and two privately owned skyscrapers?28 Is the possession of
chemical or nuclear weapons a “threat to international peace
and security”?29 Is a government’s repression of its own populace,30 or widespread ethnic massacres during a civil war,31 or

24. See id.; O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 905; Schmitt,
Bellum, supra note 18, at 1070.
25. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 282 (Security Council has “carte blanche” in
this regard).
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2.
27. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/660 (1990) (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait a breach of international peace
and security).
28. Beard, America’s New War, supra note 4, at 567 (arguing that September 11 attacks were “armed attacks” despite that relevant Security Council
resolutions [1368 and 1373] did not use that term but instead called the attacks “terrorist attacks”).
29. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) (calling Iraq’s “non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles” a threat to international peace and security).
30. Such as the situation in Kosovo in 1999, where the Security Council did
not act.
31. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 3377th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/918
(1994) (declaring the situation in Rwanda “a threat to peace and security in
the region”).
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the military coup of a democratically elected government32 a
“threat to or breach of international peace and security”? It has
been suggested that these gray areas are increasingly seen in
black and white, that is, that the Security Council has broadly
interpreted its mandate to act under Chapter VII and found
many of these gray area situations permitting the use of force in
response.33
On the other hand, an individual nation is afforded no such
discretion to use force.34 Nations are required to “confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”35 Nations are required to settle their disputes “by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,”36 and are explicitly required to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”37
There is one, limited exception to this rule: self-defense, when
a nation may defend itself individually or collectively, “if an
armed attack occurs.”38 However, the nation may defend itself
only “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.”39 The nation acting in self-defense must act within strict confines. It may not
ignore the authority of the Security Council.40 The nation must
32. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 407 (discussing 1994 Security Council
authorization of force to remove the military junta that had overthrown the
democratically elected President Aristide of Haiti, but without specific determination that there had been a breach to international peace and security).
33. For a listing of instances that the Security Council has deemed a
breach or threat of international peace and security, see Michael Schmitt, The
Sixteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Bellum Americanum Revisited: U.S. Security Strategy and the Jus ad Bellum, 176 MIL. L.
REV. 364, 405–07 (2003) (arguing that the Security Council’s discretion to
label situations a threat and fashion an appropriate response has been exercised quite creatively) [hereinafter Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited].
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1; id. at art. 2, para. 3–4.
35. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
36. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
37. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
38. Id. art. 51.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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immediately report the measures being taken to the Security
Council.41 Still, the nation itself is often the entity that must
determine whether an “armed attack” has occurred such that
the nation may defend itself, presumably with force. Usually,
this determination is not difficult.42
Further discussion of Step One (determining whether an
event falls within a category where force is a permissible response) is beyond the scope of this Article. Perhaps, it would be
counterproductive to attempt to limit the Security Council’s
ability to address a problem or crisis, because the Security
Council has a wide range of possible solutions, not limited to
military force, to bring to bear on some of the most pressing crises of the day.43
B. Step Two: Is Force Necessary? The Search for Alternatives
Once inside a category where force is a permissible response,
alternatives to force must be explored.

41. Id.
42. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), at para. 195. (“In case of individual selfdefense, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having
been the victim of an armed attack…There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed
attack…”). But see GRAY, supra note 9, at 96 (noting “there are disagreements
as to what constitutes an armed attack…[because] of cross-border activity by
irregular forces…[and] of the special characteristics of particular weapons”).
43. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 44 (2002) (The Security Council’s expansive
view of threats to or breaches of international peace and security to include
crises that are arguably national, not international, has not come about
fraudulently or cynically. Rather, the meaning of ‘threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression’ is gradually being
redefined experientially and situationally … the global system is responding, tentatively and flexibly, through ad hoc actions rather than
by systematic implementation, to new facts and threats that are redefining the threshold of what is seen to constitute a threat to peace,
requiring a powerful collective response.
Id.
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1. The UN Charter Requires the Security Council
to Search for Alternatives to Force
Throughout the UN Charter articles that address the use of
force by the Security Council, such force is limited to when it is
“necessary.” The structure of the Charter as it pertains to the
Security Council presents a number of hurdles which must be
overcome before force can be used.
Article 41 states that, in dealing with threats to peace and security:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.44

The following Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members
of the United Nations.45

Article 42 requires careful, thorough consideration of — if not
actual attempts to implement — the means set forth in Article
41, which can be broadly described as both economic and political sanctions. Military forces can be used “as may be necessary,” but those uses should at first be non-violent, for example
“demonstrations” and/or “blockade[s].”46 Actual violence ap44. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
46. Of course, blockades might need to be enforced with occasional, limited
violence, and longstanding and comprehensive blockades can wreak enormous
damage, perhaps greater damage in some cases than that caused by the use of
armed force. See Joy Gordon, Cool War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of
Mass Destruction, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Nov. 2002, at 43 (describing effects of
UN sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War and stating that 500,000 Iraqi children under age five are estimated to have died as a result). See also Max Rodenbeck, The Occupation, 50 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS 14 n.2, Aug. 14, 2003 (“The
very lowest of many estimates of child deaths between 1990 and 2000, caused
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pears to fall under the perhaps euphemistic “other operations,”
as defined in Article 42.
Chapter VI, “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” supports
the argument that the Security Council must try peaceful
means before resorting to force, at least when dealing with cognizable, international disputes.47 “The parties to any dispute,
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
resolution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”48 The
Security Council “shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the
parties to settle their dispute by such means.”49 Under this
Chapter, the Security Council is also able to investigate international disputes at its own behest,50 and nations themselves
may bring disputes to the Security Council.51 However, the text
of the Charter is unclear regarding whether these steps, and
specifically the dispute resolution steps set forth in Chapter VI,
must occur before the consideration of military force in Chapter
VII. Still, it seems reasonable to assume that they must occur
first, given that many disputes could be resolved in this manner.52 Nevertheless, the Charter’s suggestion of particular
methods of peaceful dispute resolution adds weight to the arby the rise in mortality rates from pre-Gulf War levels, is 100,000”) (citing
Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future,
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (New York), Aug. 6, 2002)).
47. U.N. CHARTER Ch. VI. Indeed, the UN Charter’s drafters’ placing this
chapter before Chapter VII, which governs the use of force, adds weight to this
argument.
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 2.
50. See U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 35.
52. That the Chapter VI methods are to be tried before force is authorized
is set forth in a pronouncement by the President of the Security Council on
May 13, 2003 that,
The Security Council reiterates its commitment to make a wider and
effective use of the procedures and means enshrined in the provisions
of the Charter of the Untied Nations on the pacific settlement of disputes, particularly Articles 33–38 (Chapter VI), as one of the essential components of its work to promote and maintain international
peace and security.
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4753d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2003/5 (2003).
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gument that a meaningful search for alternatives is a required
step.
2. The Customary Law of Self-Defense Requires Individual
Nations to Search for Alternatives to Force
The Charter provides no specific guidance on what measures
a nation under armed attack may take. For that, nations turn
to the customary rule of self-defense, known as the Caroline
Rule: “There must be a ‘necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’ and the action taken must not be ‘unreasonable or excessive,’ and it must be ‘limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it.’”53 Thus, force is authorized only where there
are no alternatives.54 Implicit in the Caroline rule is the notion
that, if possible, a decisionmaker would have to try any cognizable alternatives unless “they clearly would be futile.”55 States
must engage in this effort in good faith.56

53. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 314 (quoting Daniel Webster) (emphasis
added). This rule was penned by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in an
exchange of diplomatic papers concerning an 1837 incident where British
forces crossed the border from Canada and destroyed the Caroline, an American ship, in a New York port, because it was being used to assist Canadian
rebels against Great Britain. The rule is widely regarded as the “classic” rule
on self-defense in international law. Id. Of course, there is some controversy
over whether the Caroline standard is truly customary international law. For
a good summary of this discussion, see Michael C. Bonafede, Here, There, and
Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in
Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
155, 167 n.57 (2002) (concluding that the Caroline rule is the customary standard). See also GRAY, supra note 9, at 105–06.
As part of the basic core of self-defence all states agree that selfdefence must be necessary and proportionate…irrespective of the
status of the Caroline incident as a precedent, necessity and proportionality have played a crucial role in state justification of the use of
force in self-defence and in international response.
Id.
54. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 202.
55. Id. (quoting Schachter, supra note 16, at 1635).
56. Id.
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C. Step Three: Can the Harms Caused by the Use of Force be
Prevented or Limited?
Once resorted to, force must be used in accordance with the
norms of customary international humanitarian law of war,
also known as the jus in bello.57 These norms consist of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination58 and apply to the Security Council, nations acting under its authorization, and nations acting in self-defense.59
The term “necessity” here means military necessity, that is,
force required to accomplish a reasonable military goal.60 “Proportionality” limits belligerents in the means that they may use
and the extent of the damage which they may cause.61 “Discrimination” requires distinguishing between combatants and
civilians in target selection.62 These rules apply regardless of
the legality of the war itself.63 The jus in bello is concerned with
limiting the harms of war, and covers issues such as protecting
civilians,64 protecting the environment,65 protecting cultural

57. O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 902–03.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Gardam, Legal Restraints, supra note 19, at 312 (applying
necessity and proportionality “to the emerging new system of forceful actions
involving the Security Council are [sic] not only appropriate but warranted by
elementary considerations of humanity”); O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense,
supra note 4, at 905.
60. O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 903 (citing W. Michael
Reisman and Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law
Standards in United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 86, 94 (1998)).
61. Gardam, Proportionality and Force, supra note 5, at 391.
62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), art. 51,
para. 4 [hereinafter Protocol I].
63. See MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 306 (calling this a “recognized principle” of international law).
64. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 45–58.
65. See, e.g., id. art. 55.
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treasures,66 protecting prisoners-of-war67 and prohibiting certain
types of weapons.68
III. LEGAL REFORM OF STEP TWO (SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
TO FORCE) AND STEP THREE (PREVENTING AND LIMITING
HARM)
Steps Two and Three fail to guide decisionmakers in the
search for alternatives to force and ways to prevent or limit the
harms of force. This section shows how the law fails to guide
such consideration and then proposes specific ways that the law
could be reformed so that it would provide such guidance, first
in Step Two and then in Step Three.
A. Reforming Step Two, the Search for Alternatives to Force
This section shows the lack of guidance for the Security
Council and individual nations in seeking alternatives to force.
It then addresses how current practice and scholarship appear
to be limiting, if not eliminating, this required search. The section concludes by offering a set of specific methods that decisionmakers can use to carry out the search for alternatives to
force.
1. Problem: Lack of Guidance for Security Council’s
Search for Alternatives
Based on the discussion above, this much is clear: the UN
Charter limits the use of force to instances where it is necessary
and encourages the use of pacific means to settle disputes; such
settlements can include participation by Member Nations, the
Security Council, the UN General Assembly and the ICJ.69 Yet,
questions linger: Must all of the methods of dispute settlement
enumerated in Article 33 be tried? If so, are they the only ones
that must be tried? How vigorously must they be tried? How
66. See, e.g., id. art. 53.
67. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 44; Geneva Convention Relating
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
68. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
69. See generally U.N. CHARTER Ch. VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.”
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thoroughly must a search for alternatives to force be conducted?
What standard applies to this search and the decision of
whether to apply its results, a “reasonable person” standard
(itself often vague, as lawyers know well), or something else?70
These questions are unanswered in the law of war; indeed, they
are not even explicitly posed.71 Yet, these questions go to the
heart of the thinking process about when force may be used, a
thinking process that the law should guide.
The Security Council decides when force is necessary, but
there are no formal rules, procedures or proceedings to guide
the search for other means, or to determine after the fact
whether other means could have been used.72 If the Security
Council delegates control over armed forces to a nation, or coalition of nations, what level of oversight must it maintain? Must
the nations to whom the use of force has been delegated continue to search for alternatives to combat? The law provides
70. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 434 (Oxford University Press 1968) (1963) (using term “reasonably
necessary” in discussing necessity element of self-defense).
71. Nor are these issues addressed fully in the Just War standard, which
permits force only as a “last resort.” NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
THE HARVEST OF JUSTICE IS SOWN IN PEACE 5–6 (1993) (“Last Resort: force may
be used only after all peaceful alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted.”). That force may be used only as a “last resort” is akin to the international law concept of necessity. Michael J. Matheson, Conference, Just War
and Humanitarian Intervention: Comment on the Grotius Lecture By Professor
Jean Bethke Elshtain, 17 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 27–28 (2001). Notably, there is
a lack of clarity over how a decisionmaker determines when force is a “last
resort.” See George Weigel, The Just War Tradition and the World After September 11, Pope John XXIII Lecture, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 689, 712–13 (2002)
(arguing that “last resort” must not be read “mechanistically” to require trying, and coming to the end of, a series of non-violent options before force may
be used but instead that force is permitted, “where there is plausible reason to
believe that non-military actions are unavailable or unavailing”). There appears to be little guidance for the search for non-violent actions, a lack that
carries into at least one recent proposal to change Just War theory. See, e.g.,
PETER S. TEMES, THE JUST WAR: AN AMERICAN REFLECTION ON THE MORALITY OF
WAR IN OUR TIME 168 (2003) (declaring that the “principle of last resort is
pointedly not among the criteria that I suggest we reaffirm…[because] what
nations do instead of war — blockades, propaganda campaigns, and restrictions on trade — often create terrible harm among an enemy nation’s civilians
while leaving the military and political leadership intact.”). Temes’ argument
ignores the possibility of options beyond his description of “what nations do
instead of war.”
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 42, para. 1.
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little guidance and thus misses an opportunity to protect
against the harms that arise from the use of armed force.73
2. Problem: Lack of Guidance for Individual Nations to
Consider Alternatives to Force for Self-Defense
The same questions regarding the Security Council’s determination of necessity arise when individual nations consider
using force in self-defense. What “other means” must be tried,
and how diligently must decisionmakers try them? If nations
must try non-violent means unless they would prove futile,74
how is such futility proved? Self-defense requires that the nation has no time to do anything other than use force.75 This is
understandable if an attack is in progress, but can the assertion
be made that after suffering an armed attack, a nation may exercise the right to defend itself from further possible attacks? 76
Can this nation then take weeks or months to plan its military
campaign?77 Can a nation that has not been attacked use force
in anticipation of an attack?78 To what degree must other options be tried first?
Furthermore, when a single nation acts unilaterally, the need
for control over the use of force seems greater than when the
Security Council uses force, because the search for solutions is
likely truncated by lack of input and perspective. The decisionmaking group in such cases is likely small and in many ways
homogeneous, and there is a risk that it might engage in
“groupthink.”79 After an attack, decisionmakers might be un73. Of course, the Security Council itself can bolster its procedures to ensure that force is used only as a last resort. Notably, in the Resolution the
Security Council issued concerning Iraq on November 8, 2002, the Council
stated that should Iraq fail to comply with the new demands for weapons inspections, the Council would convene to decide what measures to take; there
would be no automatic use of force. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441, at para. 12 (2002).
74. See supra note 55.
75. See Bonafede, supra note 53, at 170.
76. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 311–14 (describing the controversy over
anticipatory self-defense).
77. See Bonafede, supra note 53, at 170 (noting “considerable dispute” over
how long this right to use force in self-defense lasts).
78. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 311–14. See supra note 76.
79. RICHARD L. JOHANNESEN, ETHICS IN HUMAN COMMUNICATION 154 (5th
ed. 2002) (“‘Groupthink’ is the collective label used by social psychologist Ir-
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able to convene or communicate with one another, or unable to
think clearly if the attack was surprising or shocking. The decisionmakers may be influenced by political concerns, such as
public demands for revenge, or the fear that if they take a quiet,
behind-the-scenes approach, they will appear indecisive or passive.
3. Problem — and a Brief Comment: The Required Search for
Alternatives is Not Carried Out in Practice, and Some
Commentators Argue for its Elimination
Step Two (the search for alternatives to force), appears to be
skipped in practice. For example, the U.S.-led coalition waged
the 1991 Gulf War under authority of Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized “all necessary means” to eject Iraqi
troops from Kuwait.80 Force was used, but there was never an
explicit finding by the Security Council that military force was
necessary.81 It has been noted that the inclusion of the phrase
“all necessary means” in the resolution was understood to authorize the use of force.82 Arguably, this eliding of a search for
alternatives violated Article 42,83 but the fact remains that nei-

ving Janis to describe characteristics of small groups whose process of problem solving and policy determination typically result in ineffectiveness, low
quality decisions, and failure to obtain objectives.”).
80. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., at para. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990).
81. Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 23–24.
82. GRAY, supra note 9, at 153 (“It is clear from the Security Council debates that this formula was understood to mean the use of force.”); Quigley,
New Order, supra note 12, at 3–4 n.14 (same, citing worldwide news accounts
of deliberations).
83. Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 23–24.
In failing to call for military force in explicit terms, the Council
played loose with the Article 42 requirement of an express finding of
the need for military force…For the state that is the object of such action, the consequences can obviously be devastating. If the Council is
to take such action, it must address it directly and decide explicitly
that it is necessary. It may not conceal such a momentous decision in
metaphorical language. Stipulating that states might take ‘all necessary means’ is too imprecise an authorization for war.
Id. But see DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 291, 295 (arguing that the 1991 Gulf
War was authorized as collective self-defense under Article 51 and that Article
42 has never been invoked by the Security Council). Nevertheless, if the coali-
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ther that article nor the rest of the UN Charter is clear on how
express the finding of “necessity” must be, how the Security
Council is to arrive at this finding, or how the Council is to
show that the finding was made.84 Indeed, there is a danger
that the word “necessary” may be taking on a talismanic role,
devoid of its usual meaning. That is, the Security Council’s
conclusion that a state may take “all necessary means” may be
seen as approval for using force — rather than requiring the
search for and exhaustion of alternatives implied by the word
“necessary.” 85
Some international law commentators have suggested eliminating the requirement that force be used only when “necessary” in the struggle against terrorism, to give nations, especially the U.S., an expanded right to use force internationally.86
tion was acting under Article 51, its use of force would be limited by necessity
and proportionality. See supra Part II.B.2.
84. Malaysia complained that Resolution 678 contained no requirement
that the Security Council actually permit force. Quigley, New Order, supra
note 12, at 24–25.
85. GRAY, supra note 9, at 153 (discussing use of “necessary” in Resolution
678 and noting, “The same (or similar) euphemistic formula has been used in
almost all of the subsequent [Security Council] resolutions authorizing the use
of force by states.”).
86. Beard, America’s New War, supra note 4, at 585–86 (2002). Beard simply skips over any requirement of necessity and dismisses the Caroline rule —
stated supra, at Part II.B.2 — by saying, “some writers are fond of citing [the
Caroline rule].” Beard also adds that “[s]uch a strict and self-defeating version of necessity expansively based on the Caroline test does not appear to be
consistent with the right of self-defense under customary international law
and has been vigorously opposed by a number of writers, particularly in the
context of fighting terrorism.” Id. See also, Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral
Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 297, 302
(1987) (arguing that the Caroline standard should not apply to terrorist
threats); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 50 n.57 (2002) (“Addressing the customary international law constraints relating to necessity and
proportionality is outside the scope of this Essay.”). But the Author appears
to extinguish the requirement of necessity when asking,
Can the United States possibly be expected not to respond to the
source of such actions through resort to proportionate military force?
While the desire to minimize the trans-boundary use of military force
is central to contemporary world order, international rules that preclude a state from responding forcibly to extraordinary threats to its
fundamental security interests – indeed, perhaps when ‘the very survival of a State would be at stake’ – are destined not to endure.
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To allow for this expansion is illogical, because the goal for
which force is used should not alone dictate whether force can
be used. One terrorist target might be dealt with more effectively with force than another. For example, force might be effective against a terrorist training camp, yet ineffective, or even
counterproductive, if used against a nation where terrorists are
known to live among unwitting or subjugated civilians, or
among civilians who share their political views. So legalizing
the use of force against “terrorists” or “terrorism” is inappropriate, because not only might force be unnecessary, but it could
actually exacerbate the situation by breeding more terrorism.
Terrorists might fight back, but not against the soldiers who are
destroying their camps. They (or their allies, family or friends)
might plant bombs in the capital of the country that dispatched
troops to destroy the camps.87 In any given case, there may well
be other, more effective, and less destructive, options.88 CategoId. Advisory Opinion 95, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8)); William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and
Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 471 (1990)
(arguing that with the advent of terrorism, particularly in the context of Israel’s war with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the “interpretation of
necessity is very different from that in a singular incident along the U.S.Canadian border”); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National
Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 96–97 (1989) (Caroline rule “exaggerates the test
of necessity in a situation where the issue was dicta… [and] when war was
still a permissible option for states that had actually been attacked”).
87. The efficacy of military force against terrorism has been questioned,
recently by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. World Leaders Meet in NY for
Counterterrorism Conference, CHANNEL NEWSASIA, Sept. 23, 2003.
We delude ourselves if we think that military force alone can defeat
terrorism. It may sometimes be necessary to use force to counter terrorist groups but we need to do much more than that if terrorism is to
be stopped. Terrorists thrive on despair. They may gain recruits or
supporters where peaceful and legitimate ways of redressing a grievance do not exist.
Id. Also, it appears that the U.S. military action in Afghanistan has not succeeded in defeating or meaningfully weakening Al Qaeda. See e.g., Faye Bowers, Al Qaeda May be Rebuilding, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 5, 2003,
LEXIS-NEXIS Library; David Johnston, C.I.A. Puts Risk of Terror Strike at
9/11 Levels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at A1.
88. For a creative, wide-ranging, general list of ways to combat terrorism,
see United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, A Classification of Counter-Terrorism Measures, available at http://www.undcp.org/terr
orism_measures.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2003).

File: FoleyMacro.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/19/2003 5:03 PM

AVOIDING A DEATH DANCE

Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:32 PM

151

rization risks that decisionmakers will focus on the wrong questions, diverting inquiry from alternatives to using force or the
effectiveness of using force. For example, instead of asking,
“Are the people we want to kill ‘terrorists’?,” decisionmakers
should ask, “How can we accomplish this goal (e.g., defeating
terrorists, preventing genocide, etc.) without using force?” The
latter question may well lead to different, and better, answers.
Indeed, the arguments that legal strictures on use of force
should be loosened to deal with terrorism show why these strictures need to be kept tight, especially during crises, where emotions can outrun common sense and clear thinking.
There is no foundation in law, either, for loosening the necessity requirement in dealing with terrorism. Notably, there is no
agreed-upon definition of terrorism in international law.89
Therefore, to allow nations to use force against terrorists would
place too much discretion in the hands of national leaders in an
area of law that seeks to limit such discretion; under the UN
Charter, nations pledge to place primary control over the use of
force in the Security Council.90 It would not necessarily reduce
terrorism, but it would almost certainly result in an overall increase in the use of force, and its attendant miseries, which
would contravene the UN Charter values of peace and security.91 Furthermore, eliminating the necessity requirement here
89. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of
Military Force, 18 WIS. INT’L L. J. 145, 181 (2000) (nothing that there is no
definition of “terrorism” in international law).
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1. It is likely that ignoring necessity as a
legal requirement could simply be aggressive “lawyering” on behalf of the U.S.
This explanation cannot be readily dismissed when the commentators are
U.S. government officials. For example, Jack Beard, when he wrote his article
cited supra note 4, was Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense; Abraham D. Sofaer, cited supra note 86,
was a Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State from 1985–1990; and
Alberto R. Coll, cited supra note 86, was Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow, U.S. Naval War College.
91. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. See also W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the
Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 279 (1985). Professor Riesman sees the danger that such categorization poses for UN Charter
values. He lists nine categories where there appears to be “varying support
for unilateral uses of force,” but cautions, “[m]erely locating an individual use
of force in a particular category does not mean that it is lawful.” Id. at 281–
82. Professor Reisman suggests using as a guiding principle the question,
“Will a particular use of force, whatever its justification otherwise, enhance or
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is an avoidance of law, in the sense of due process, as such action appears partially grounded in a desire to punish terrorists.92 Whenever possible, terrorists should be dealt with
through the existing legal system, national or international.93
This categorical approach ultimately amounts to an attempt
to use the ends to justify the means.94 And, in the international
law concerning the use of force, the means matter. If a goal can
be accomplished without the use of force, then force should not
be used. The inquiry into non-violent means is thus a crucial
component of this area of law, and the law should give more,
not less, guidance for it. It is to such a reform that this Article
now turns.
4. A Solution: Requiring Decisionmakers to Engage in
Thinking Techniques that Can Improve the Search for
Alternatives to Force
The interest of this Article lies in the thinking and questioning that go to the heart of the decision-making process regarding the necessity of force in a particular instance, questions that
can lead to reasonable alternatives to force and prevent its use
in the first place. As a norm, some search for alternatives must
be undertaken, and that search must be conducted with creativity and with a good faith effort to avoid the use of force, not to
seek justification for it.
An initial difficulty is defining “good faith” and “creativity” in
this instance. This difficulty can be overcome, at least in part,
by recognizing that the search for other means is obligatory,
and that it is the embodiment of the purposes and principles of
the UN Charter to avoid war.95 The difficulty may also be overundermine world order?” Id. at 282. This Article suggests specific criteria
along lines similar to Professor Reisman’s guiding principle, as well as ways to
guide decisionmakers to discover alternatives to force. See infra III.A.4.,
III.B.2.
92. See, e.g., Coll, supra note 86, at 299 (“There are three general purposes
behind military responses to terrorism: long-term deterrence, short-term prevention, and punishment.”).
93. See O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 904–06.
94. See Judith G. Gardam, Noncombatant Immunity and the Gulf Conflict,
32 VA J. INT’L L. 813, 836 (1992) [hereinafter Gardam, Noncombatant Immunity].
95. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
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come by requiring strict adherence to the capabilities and tools
that already exist in the UN to help resolve disputes.96 These
tools could also be improved, and disciplines and practices such
as conflict resolution, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy could be made the rule instead of the exception.97 These
tools can work, if tried.98
Another improvement would be to require decisionmakers to
follow specific guidelines or answer specific questions that help
them find and consider alternatives, as well as requiring decisionmakers to explain why particular alternatives were not, or
are not being, tried. In the UN Security Council, for example,
committees could be formed to seek alternatives to the use of
force, perhaps in consultation with appropriate experts. Such
committees could be required to conduct this search before any
actual use of force is authorized. In times of peace, such committees could be encouraged to address hypothetical crises for
the purpose of creating documents, studies, or commentary to
the laws of war that would provide examples that can be turned
to, examined, and perhaps applied in times of conflict.
The Security Council should “judicialize”99 its decisionma
king, i.e., show the thinking behind its conclusions regarding
the use of force. The Security Council could be required to prepare a document on the necessity of the use of force in a particular instance.100 Legitimate use of force may be proven by show96. For a clear explanation of this and other methods, see KEITH SUTER,
ALTERNATIVE TO WAR: THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
(1st ed. 1986).
97. See LOUIS B. SOHN, BROADENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN
PREVENTING, MITIGATING OR ENDING INTERNATIONAL OR INTERNAL CONFLICTS
THAT THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 5–6 (Int’l R. of L. Center
Occasional Papers, 2d Ser., No. 1, 1997).
98. See MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 430 (“In the final analysis, the effectiveness of the United Nations depends on the willingness of member states to
cooperate, and no amount of changes in the structure of the United Nations
will guarantee its effectiveness” without cooperation.).
99. I am grateful to Professor Kevin Boyle of the University of Essex for
using this term to describe my presentation of this idea at the International
Symposium on Terrorism and Human Rights, sponsored by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, Egypt, January 26–28, 2002. At that
time Professor Boyle was serving as Senior Adviser to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights.
100. The Security Council is not required to act in any instance.
MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 427. Nor is it required to give any basis for its
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ing that there were no reasonable alternatives, and that force
actually would be effective in achieving the desired outcome or
goal.101 Such a document could be styled as findings of fact and
conclusions of law, as used in the U.S. legal system. This “opinion” could be required for all uses of force within and without
formal Security Council control, such as where the Security
Council authorizes a coalition of member nations to use force, as
in the 1991 Gulf War;102 where the Security Council has not participated at all, as in the 1999 NATO air strikes in the former
Yugoslavia;103 where the Security Council has not authorized
force, as in the 2003 invasion of Iraq;104 or, where a nation acts
under a claim of self-defense, as in the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.105 Such a document could be required even
after the fact, if time constraints made it impossible or unduly
burdensome to write it before force was used. This process
would provide at least some oversight and create examples for
future reference.
Added to all of the tasks of the Security Council or other decisionmakers could be the encouragement or even requirement to
reasoning in a particular situation, as it is a political, not a judicial, body.
DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 207, 282, 304–08.
101. Effectiveness is part of the determination of necessity. Lobel, supra
note 12, at 554.
102. See S.C.Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990).
Authoriz[ing] Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991, fully implements,
as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 [requiring
Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the
area.
Id.
103. White, supra note 12, at 41–42.
104. Although the Security Council did not authorize the U.S.-U.K. invasion
of Iraq, the Security Council has not made an authoritative statement or
passed a resolution declaring whether the invasion violated the UN Charter
or other international law.
105. The Security Council did not specifically authorize military action
against Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Nor did it
declare that the U.S.-led coalition violated the UN Charter when it invaded
that country. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
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use “creative problem solving,” a method of problem-solving
where one defines the problem, generates a wide variety of possible solutions and then, using reason and experience, chooses
the best among them.106 A characteristic of competent problemsolving (as well as critical thinking) is asking the right questions.107 For example, in generating solutions, one might repeatedly ask, “What else might we do here?” To guide that inquiry, one might also ask, “How can we see this problem as an
opportunity to address the needs of a wide spectrum of people
and constituencies?” To generate answers, one would use an
array of thinking techniques and methods, both traditional and
innovative, all of which can be taught and learned.108 It may be
difficult to come up with alternatives to force, but it is possible,
especially if many people with relevant and broad experience
are included in the process.
106. “Creative Problem Solving,” which employs this method, is a growing
movement in U.S. legal education and beyond. This method has been described as follows:
Creative problem solving is an evolving intellectual discipline that
requires lawyers to define problems so as to permit the broadest possible array of solutions, both legal and non-legal. Creative problem
solving seeks many points of view, and systematically examines problems for their relational implications at the individual, institutional
and societal levels. It seeks a caring approach and solutions that are
imaginative or transformative in nature.
Creative Problem Solving Offers Hope…and Solutions, RES ISPA: THE
MAGAZINE OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW, at 2 (Winter 1999) (quoting Janeen Kerper, Professor and Academic Director, McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving, California Western School of Law, San Diego, California). The following is a step-by-step description of creative problem solving
from a workbook that teaches the process: Exploring the Problem; Establishing Goals; Generating Ideas; Choosing the Solution; Implementing the Solution; Evaluating the Solution. ROBERT A. HARRIS, CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING:
A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH (2002).
107. See HARRIS, supra note 106, at 37–46. See also JOSINA M. MAKAU &
DEBIAN L. MARTY, COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION: A MODEL FOR DELIBERATIVE
COMMUNITY 16–18 (2001) (importance of questioning to critical thinking).
108. See generally e.g., JAMES L. ADAMS, CONCEPTUAL BLOCKBUSTING: A
GUIDE TO BETTER IDEAS 1–3 (1985 3d ed.); EDWARD DE BONO, DE BONO’S
THINKING COURSE (1985). These are but two of some of the outstanding leaders, and books, in the field. The Security Council could be trained to use such
techniques. Such training is in fact regularly provided by consultants to high
level management of large corporations and other institutions, particularly
elite ones. See Jay Cocks, Let’s Get Crazy!: Creativity is the Buzz Word as
Companies Try to Spark Daring New Ideas, TIME, June 11, 1990, at 40.
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The following are examples of questions that decisionmakers
could be required to ask and answer when they are considering
whether the use of force is necessary:
Defining the problem:
(1) What is the threat or harm to be limited?
(2) What is/are the precise goal(s), and what value(s) are
sought to be achieved and vindicated?
Process:
(3) What cognitive techniques or methods can we use to find
possible solutions?
(4) Who outside of the decision-making group should be involved in this search for alternatives?
(5) What facts are needed?
(6) What are some possible solutions? Will they work?
Why/why not?
Effectiveness:
(7) What are the best ways to achieve the goal and vindicate
the value? (Attitude is important. For example, the question
is not, “Can we use force?” but, “Must we resort to force, and
how can we avoid using force?”
(8) What are the short term costs and benefits of each possible
solution? Are there ways to increase benefits and limit costs?
Will our goal be met in the short run? The short term can be
broken into specific terms: one week, one month, two months,
etc.
(9) What are the long term costs and benefits of each possible
solution? Are there ways to increase benefits and limit costs?
Will our goal be met in the long run? The long term can be
broken into specific terms: six months, one year, two years,
etc.
(10) What is the likely response by the target nation? Will the
nation fight back? If it fights back, will it respond with force —
conventional or “asymmetrical,” i.e., terrorism? Is the target
allied with other forces that might fight back regardless of the
response by the target, thus increasing overall violence?

Of course, these questions can be refined, but should serve as
starting points for reform. Some of these questions may be unanswerable to a reasonable degree of certainty in some situa-
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tions. Finding answers will be more likely if the Security Council’s ability to conduct fact-finding in given instances is improved.109 Before discussing further how to implement this set
of questions into the Security Council’s decision-making process, this Article turns to reforming Step Three.
B. Reforming Step Three, Limiting Harm
1. Problem: Bad Timing — Step Three Fails
to Protect Against Likely Harms
There is a temporal gap between the jus ad bellum, the law
on when a nation or the UN may resort to force, and the jus in
bello, the law on how a nation or the UN may use force, that is,
how it may conduct a war.110 In other words, Steps One and
Two are taken before force is used, and Step Three is not taken
until force is being used. This gap can be deadly. Military
strategies, weapons and tactics are often developed and implemented before a decision has been reached as to whether they
are legal (in the jus in bello).111 Moreover, the legality and practical effects of new developments in weapons or strategy are not
considered as part of the decision of whether to authorize
force.112 For example, Resolution 678 authorized Member Nations to use “all necessary means” to eject Iraqi troops from
Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War.113 The Security Council appears
to have been unaware of the coalition’s plans to target civilian
water purification plants and the electrical grid in Iraq, argua-

109. John Quigley, Security Council Fact-finding: A Prerequisite to Effective
Prevention of War, 7 FL. J. INT’L L. 191, 193 (1992) (arguing that “the Security
Council’s fact-finding capability is inadequate, and that more active factfinding is needed so that the Council can make rational decisions about
breach of the peace complaints.”).
110. See Gardam, Proportionality and Force, supra note 5, at 397.
111. Gardam, Noncombatant Immunity, supra note 94, at 836 (“This is not
unusual for the law of armed conflict, where its provisions always lag behind
new developments in warfare. As soon as one method of warfare is regulated,
another is revealed.”); Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited, supra note 33,
at 418–19 (2003) (considering “cyber operations” as an example of a rapidly
evolving technology which may be used militarily although the legality of such
practices is yet to be determined).
112. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–42.
113. U.N. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
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bly an attack on Iraqi civilians violating the jus in bello.114 The
Security Council may also have been unaware of the likely extent of civilian casualties.115 Planners believed that 2,000 would
perish, 116 when by some counts, many times that number were
killed.117 After the war, the Security Council was silent about
the extent of this destruction in Iraq, which was arguably not
“necessary” to the process of ejecting Iraqi troops from Kuwait.118
The law concerning the decision to use force also neglects to
address other, non-military harms that can occur as a result of
war planning.119 For example, knowledge that the U.S. would
attack Afghanistan after September 11, 2001 led many Afghanis to flee to the mountains where they lived in refugee
camps and risked starvation.120 Additionally, in preparation for
that war, U.S. officials cut deals with various nations for flyover and basing rights; some of these nations, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, were already notorious
114. See, e.g., Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 19 n.112 (1992) (arguing that these attacks violated Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, which prohibits “an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated”). See also Gardam, Proportionality
and Force, supra note 5, at 404 (“[m]any of the decisions involving the application of proportionality would have been taken at the planning stage of the
campaign” in the Gulf War).
115. Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 19 (arguing that “the damage to
civilian objectives as assessed by the UN team was too extensive to be excused
as inevitable damages incidental to lawful targeting”).
116. Id. at 19 n.112 (citing BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 341 (1991)).
117. The number of Iraqi civilians killed in the Gulf War is notoriously hard
to pin down. Estimates of the number of civilians killed ranged from 5,000 –
15,000 during the war, and 4,000–6,000 afterward, from lack of medical care
for wounds or malnutrition. George Lopez, The Gulf War: Not so Clean, 47
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 7 (Sept. 1991). CNN.com, in its “Gulf
War Facts,” notes simply that “[a]ccording to Baghdad, civilian casualties
numbered more than 35,000,” at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.
war/facts/gulfwar/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
118. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990). See Quigley, New Order, supra note 12, at 19.
119. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–42.
120. Mass Migration from Afghanistan, S. F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 25, 2001, at
A1 (“A U.N. official called the mass migration within Afghanistan and across
its borders ‘the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.’”).
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abusers of human rights.121 In some cases the presence of U.S.
and other foreign troops exacerbated the risk of protests and
resistance among citizens, which led leaders to further repress
their populaces.122 The law of war should address such consequences of war-planning.
Another limitation of the jus in bello is that, in general, these
rules are enforced by the belligerents themselves, as there is
generally no third party to referee the fighting. International
control, if any, comes later, in the form of war crimes tribunals.123 However, such tribunals are rare, and those who commit
war crimes often go unpunished.124 Prosecution is also selective.
For example, it is unlikely that there will be international tribunals to try U.S. soldiers for alleged war crimes in Afghanistan or Iraq.125 Indeed, U.S. leaders fought against the efforts of
other nations to include U.S. military personnel and political
leaders under the jurisdiction of a new, permanent international tribunal, the International Criminal Court, which came
into effect on July 1, 2002 and which has jurisdiction over war
crimes and crimes against humanity.126

121. America’s Central Asian Allies, N.Y. TIMES (editorial), Oct. 2, 2001, at
A24. These are rights that the UN Security Council can simply require, but
for which a nation acting unilaterally must negotiate. U.N. CHARTER art. 43,
para. 1.
122. See For Whom the Liberty Bell Tolls, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 31–Sept. 6,
2002, at 18 (detailing widespread reduction (legitimate and illegitimate) of
human rights by governments worldwide under the color of anti-terrorism
after September 11, 2001). See also Nick Paton Walsh, US Looks Away as
New Ally Tortures Islamists: Uzbekistan’s President Steps up Repression of
Opponents, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 26, 2003, at 13; Craig Skehan, Afghan War Sparks New Repression In Kyrgyzstan, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept.
28, 2002, at 18.
123. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 9, 18 (arguing that this post hoc justice can
have a deterrent effect, which can help “the pursuit of peace”).
124. Id. at 11.
125. For example, no international tribunal has been formed concerning an
alleged atrocity that may have involved U.S. and Northern Alliance soldiers.
Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., The Death Convoy of Afghanistan, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 26, 2002, at 20. An international forum is not only important to vindicate the rights of victims, but it is also important to vindicate soldiers, and
their sponsoring nation, who may have been wrongly accused of a war crime.
126. For a sometimes humorous account of the U.S. antipathy toward the
ICC, see Lauren Comiteau, The International Criminal Court: In Dutch with
America, CHIC. TRIB., July 22, 2002, at C1.
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Finally, because international control over war-planning is
lacking, there is a risk in the case of self-defense that national
leaders will be ill-equipped to decide whether to apply force,
because they lack both perspective and information. For example, according to an ICJ opinion, the proportionality requirement for self-defense may be interpreted to permit the use of
nuclear weapons “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”127 But
how “extreme” must the circumstances be? That is, what would
count as threatening “the very survival of a State”? There is a
risk that national leaders might overcompensate in the fog and
stress of an attack.128
2. A Solution: Requiring Decisionmakers to Consider Likely
Harms, and Ways to Prevent or Limit Them, as Part
of the Determination of Whether to Authorize Force
How decisionmakers intend to use force should be considered
in determining whether they may legally use force. One possible reform is for the Security Council to consider the proposed
military strategy as part of its decision of whether to authorize
force. The Security Council should explore specific ways to
avoid or limit the likely harms that will result from the plan
and then require such protective measures.129 This is primarily
a change in timing. Instead of maintaining the separation of
jus ad bellum and jus in bello concerns, international law
should seek to develop a more fluid approach. This approach
would be more realistic, given that some of the harms that the
jus in bello seeks to prevent may have already occurred before
the jus in bello is addressed, as described in the previous section.130
127. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
1996 I.C.J. 226, 227, 263, 266 (July 8).
128. See BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 436 (“There is…great agreement and
community of interest behind the proposition that, in the era of nuclear and
thermonuclear armament, self-help involves intolerable risks.”).
129. Secrecy of plans should not be a concern: the Security Council is capable of meeting in secret, if necessary. O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense, supra
note 4, at 908 n.117.
130. See supra Part III.B.1. Notably, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, in its proposed principles for assessing the legitimacy of
humanitarian interventions, suggests that the principles may be “applied
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The following are some questions that decisionmakers should
be required to ask in determining whether force can be used
legally. These questions address harms that result directly and
immediately from the decision to use force, falling within the
gap between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello:
General:
(1) What are the likely civilian casualties, and can they be limited?
(2) What are the likely military casualties on both sides, and
can they be limited? This criterion should recognize that combatants are often conscripts.
(3) Will there be a meaningful chance for soldiers to surrender
before any opening salvos?
Weaponry:
(4) What are the short term and long term medical effects of
the weapons being used? Will weapons create danger in the
conflict theater long after hostilities end, as is the case with
depleted uranium and unexploded cluster bombs and land
mines?
“Conflict contagion”131:
(5) What is the likelihood that a proposed conflict will escalate? That it will exacerbate existing conflicts or spark new
ones?
Human rights:

either before an intervention in order to determine whether force should be
used, or [afterward] to assess whether an intervention was justifiable.”
INDEPENDENT INT’L COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,
INT’L RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 193 (Oxford University Press 2000). One
such principle is that “[t]here must be even stricter adherence to the laws of
war and international humanitarian law than in standard military operations. This applies to all aspects of the military operation, including any post
cease-fire occupation.” Id. at 195. Such a heightened adherence to these laws
is in keeping with the rationale behind intervention, which is to protect a
civilian population. That said, it can certainly be argued that civilian populations should be shown such concern whatever the reason force is used.
131. See Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of
Civilian Bombing Casualties?” Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute,
Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #11, 18 Jan. 2002 (revised
Jan. 24, 2002), at http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html.
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(6) Will the use of force have a negative effect on human rights
of people in combatant and neighboring nations? Is there
likely to be repression by these governments?
(7) Will the conflict touch off humanitarian crises such as
refugees and starvation? Will the destruction of military or
“dual use” civilian/military targets (such as electrical grids
and water treatment plants) also affect the lives of civilians?
Economics:
(8) How will the conflict affect the economies of various nations, and of the world? What will the effect be on world markets, such as stock exchanges or oil markets?
International peace and security:
(9) Will the government of the targeted nation be changed as a
result of the use of force against it? What kind of government
will replace it? What will be the resulting effects on international peace, security, and human rights?
(10) With respect to rebuilding conflict zones, what types of
weaponry will be used? Will dangers from these weapons persist for civilians and builders after the war? Will important
infrastructure be targeted? Is there a rebuilding plan? Will
the war result in chaos, creating humanitarian disasters or an
environment conducive to terrorism?
Development and respect for international law:
(11) What precedent will the use of force in this case yield?
(12) Balancing of harms: How will these harms be balanced
against the goal that the use of force meant to achieve?

A dynamic could come into play: by being forced to consider in
advance the likely harms and costs associated with the use of
force, and, where possible, to make these considerations public,
planners proposing to use force could see that option as less and
less attractive. There might be increased public pressure on
leaders to avoid these costs and, ultimately, to avoid the use of
force.132
This Article now turns to implementing the recommended reforms of Steps Two and Three.

132. Indeed, national laws requiring leaders to consider these costs could be
proposed. See infra Part IV.E.
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IV. BEYOND LEGAL REFORM: IMPLEMENTING THESE PROPOSALS
THROUGH IMPROVED PRACTICES
One way to make these changes part of international law
would be to include the series of questions set forth above in the
UN Charter, perhaps as commentary or in an appendix.133 Of
course, such a change might be difficult to effect. Nevertheless,
there are ways to implement these proposals through less formal changes in practice. For example, political pressure could
lead the Security Council to articulate its decision concerning
the use of force. Such pressure can also be enhanced by initiatives from other entities such as the General Assembly, ICJ,
NGOs, scholars in universities and think tanks, and the public.
Also, changes in U.S. and other nations’ laws can help protect
some of the interests that this Article seeks to protect under
international law.
A. Rethinking Security Council Practice
There are many ways as a practical matter that the Security
Council could improve its search for alternatives to force as well
as its consideration of ways to prevent or limit harms likely to
result from any use of force. It could voluntarily adopt the
process and questions set forth above.134 As part of this process,
the Security Council could continue its trend of working with
outside experts, which could help it find alternatives to force.
In various other matters, the Security Council encourages such
participation. For example, since 1995, the NGO Working
Group on the Security Council, a group of about 30 representatives from NGOs such as Amnesty International, CARE, and
Oxfam, has endeavored to build informal relationships with
members of the Security Council. 135 This involvement is a step
133. See, e.g., GRENVILLE CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH
WORLD LAW (Harvard University 1958) (proposing a revised UN Charter,
which would include detailed commentary and “annexes”).
134. See supra Parts III.A.4. and III.B.2.
135. NGO Working Group on the Security Council Information Statement,
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/statements/current.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2003) (noting that “Council members have found that NGOs
can provide exceedingly valuable field information from their contacts in crisis
areas, helping to improve their delegations’ awareness of the issues and contributing to the Council’s policy-making process. In many cases, NGOs may
even be directly involved in UN field programs.”). Information about the NGO
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in the right direction. With the weight and eyes of the world
upon it, the Security Council should welcome such input.
Yet, that grave weight also encourages secrecy, which can
hamper another way to improve the Security Council’s consideration of alternatives to force and of ways to prevent the likely
harms that force can cause: transparency. Much of the work of
the Security Council already takes place behind closed doors,
especially among the Permanent Five Members (China, France,
Russia, the U.K. and the U.S.).136 Greater transparency would
likely encourage the inquiry and debate that can lead to better
ideas. Transparency and openness can discipline decisionmaking by encouraging those involved to adhere to principles of
reason and equity As groups such as Human Rights Watch
suggest, it is easier to ignore human rights when no one is looking.137 Thus, the time has come to reform current Security
Council and UN rules and practice to encourage inclusiveness
and openness when possible.138
As pointed out above, the Security Council could be required
to produce a document discussing alternatives to force and
evaluating the likelihood of success of each alternative. Thus,
the range of the search could be seen, and specious, tendentious
arguments exposed.139 Such attention should be required because few decisions are graver or more worthy of discussion

Working Group on the Security Council can be found on the Global Policy
Forum website at www.globalpolicy.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2002).
136. MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 376–77 (noting the “lack of transparency
of the decisionmaking by the P5…or P3 (the Western powers which often hold
meetings in secret, following which only the formal votes become part of the
public record)”).
137. Information about Human Rights Watch can be found on the Human
Rights Watch website at http://www.hrw.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
138. Of course, if it is being led in creative problem solving exercises, privacy might be required, as some of these exercises promote a wide-ranging
search for answers that permits introduction of possibly silly or outlandish
ideas as a way of arriving at practical ideas. See e.g., Adams, supra note 108,
at 134–37 (describing group “brainstorming” exercise and its requirement to
come up with many “wild” ideas).
139. See BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 436 (“In attempting to provide effective legal controls the jurist must concentrate on the immediate source of
danger — the use of force — and characterize the conditions in which it is
prohibited in such a way that states can only give justifications for their illegal acts in terms of considerable implausibility.”).
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than whether to unleash a modern war-making machine, which
produces death, refugees and other crises.
B. Rethinking General Assembly Practice
If the Security Council will not conduct an inquiry regarding
the necessity of using force and ways to limit the attendant
harms in a given case, then the General Assembly should do so
instead. The Security Council has “primary” but not exclusive
responsibility for matters concerning international peace and
security.140 If the Security Council fails to act, the General Assembly may thus exercise a secondary authority, making nonbinding recommendations to nations.141 There is nothing to stop
the General Assembly from working with experts, activists and
scholars to find alternatives to force in impending conflicts,
which could pressure the Security Council to justify its decisions. The General Assembly could produce a “brief” or “opinion” as described above142 to make sure that the questions set
forth above are asked and answered.143 In addition, the General
Assembly could proactively initiate UN focus on looming problems that could, if left to fester, endanger international peace
and security.
C. Rethinking International Court of Justice Practice
A more active use of the ICJ144 by UN member nations has the
potential to provide guidance for the development of the jus ad
bellum. Member nations could initiate claims for damages in
140. UN Charter, art. 24, para. 1. See also Nigel. D. White, The Legality of
Bombing in the Name of Humanity, 5 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 27, 41–2 (2000).
141. See Schachter, supra note 16, at 1622.
The General Assembly, which may decide important questions by a
two-thirds majority, has on occasion adopted decisions that involve
judgments on the use of force. These decisions are not binding under
the Charter. That does not mean that they lack ‘authority,’ for at
least in some cases such resolutions will be regarded as expressing
the ‘general will’ of the international community and as persuasive
evidence of legal obligation.
Id. See generally Schachter, Alf Ross Memorial Lecture: The Crisis of Legitimation in the United Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT’L. RET. 3 (1981).
142. See supra Parts III.A.4. and IV.A.
143. See supra Parts III.A.4. and III.B.2.
144. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
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the ICJ concerning particular, actual uses of force. Noncombatant nations that are indirectly affected by a particular
use of force (such as by suffering economic or environmental
damage) could develop legal theories on which to base claims for
damages. Such actions would help create legal doctrines and
potentially prevent future uses of force.145 Individuals, businesses and other entities that are not entitled to bring cases
under ICJ jurisdiction could file similar claims in other courts
with international jurisdiction. Also, it remains to be seen how
practice before the new International Criminal Court will take
shape, but prosecution for war crimes — especially of leaders
who violate the jus ad bellum — could be a promising way to
clarify and develop this law.
The ICJ offers the potential for prospective guidance, too.
The General Assembly or qualified UN organizations could flex
their muscles under Article 96146 to request that the ICJ issue
an advisory opinion in certain instances. 147 Indeed, the ICJ has
shown that it can conduct thorough inquiries concerning the
legality of the use of force.148 In advisory opinions, questions can
be framed more broadly than the question a particular member
nation may pose in the context of an actual claim for damages.
For example, in 1996, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in response to a General Assembly request, which the ICJ framed as
follows: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”149 The advantage of
145. GRAY, supra note 9, at 11–12 (noting the potential of the International
Court of Justice to clarify the laws on “this sensitive subject matter of the use
of force” as states increasingly bring claims before it).
146. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1.
147. The General Assembly may “authorize other UN organs or specialized
agencies to request advisory opinions on ‘legal questions arising within the
scope of their activities.’” Advisory opinions are not legally binding but nonetheless have substantial persuasive value.” JEFFERY L. DUNOFF, ET. AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS ACTORS, PROCESS 69 (2002). See also, U.N.
CHARTER art. 96.
148. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
149. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
1996 I.C.J. 226, 228 (July 8). This question was originally, “Is the threat or
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international
law? [Est-il permis en droit international de recourir a la menace ou a l’emploi d’armes nucleaire en toute circonstance?]” UN GA Res. 49/75K (Dec. 15,
1994). This question was not novel: The General Assembly passed a reso-
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the advisory opinion here is obvious: no nation had to wait to be
attacked by nuclear weapons before raising the question. Perhaps similar questions could be framed by the General Assembly regarding what could be considered, in light of September
11, pressing international legal issues: whether the use of military force to topple the governments of “terrorist nations” is legal, and under what circumstances would it be legal to use force
in response to terrorist attacks? Obviously, great care would be
needed to frame such a question, but seeking an advisory opinion is a viable way of challenging the increased and increasing
readiness of various nations to use (and perhaps abuse) force in
this way. A similar question could be framed regarding under
what circumstances the use of force would be a legitimate
method of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
One can also imagine a country that feared an attack, perhaps a preemptive strike to destroy actual or alleged weapons of
mass destruction,150 asking the ICJ for a provisional ruling on
the legality of such an attack.151 Even if the ICJ ultimately re-

lution in 1961 declaring nuclear weapons illegal, and the request for the advisory opinion from the ICJ was originally brought in 1993 by the WHO. See
MALANCZUK, supra note 11, at 346–50.
150. Such as the 2003 U.S.-U.K. war against Iraq. Further wars are likely,
given the National Security Strategy published by the Bush Administration in
2002, which claims that the U.S. has a right to wage such wars as a counterproliferation measure. The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, Chapter V, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2003).
151. The ICJ entertained and ultimately rejected a claim by Libya for provisional measures to prevent a feared attack or embargo by the U.S. for refusing
to extradite two Libyan nationals suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1989, which killed over 250 people.
Libya claimed that it was exercising its rights pursuant to the 1971 Montreal
Convention on terrorism against aircraft. Between the time of Libya’s filing
for provisional measures and the Court’s decision, the Security Council set
forth a Resolution requiring extradition. The Court rejected Libya’s request
for provisional measures and held that in this instance the Security Council
Resolution had to be followed, but added that it was “not at this stage called
upon to determine definitively the legal effect of Security Council resolution
748 (1992).” Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of
the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126–27 (Apr. 14). As such,
the case leaves open the possibility of a sort of “judicial review” of Security
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jected such a move, the nation fearing attack could benefit from
making its case in this forum so that alternatives and likely
harms might be considered, which in turn might erode international support for the attack.
D. Rethinking Practices of NGOs, Scholars, and the Public to
Promote Better Thinking About Using Force and to Pressure
Decisionmakers to do the Same
In lieu of, or in addition to, these efforts by UN organs, interested experts, activists and scholars should step up their own
efforts to generate and publish alternatives to using force, and
generate popular support by showing the common benefits that
will accrue to all nations. Such ideas should be published
widely, including in times of peace, because once an attack occurs or a crisis unfolds, individuals who oppose military action
are often asked, “If you oppose war, then what do you suggest
instead?” and, “Are you saying we should do nothing?” A population responding to an attack (and fearing further attacks) is,
understandably, not in a calm and deliberative mood. The law
must take this reality into account. Ideally, leaders and experts
would be able to point to concrete alternatives to war that could
likely prove less costly and more effective in achieving the desired goal in a time of crisis.152
Ultimately, one way or another, governments respond to their
people. If problems are capable of solutions less costly than
war, and those solutions are published widely, reasonable publics would demand that they be tried. Shining light on the decision-making process, challenging decisionmakers to be smarter
and more creative, and publicly judging them on these qualities

Council resolutions, a power which — if it exists — could help develop the law
of war. See GRAY, supra note 9, at 10.
152. Few alternatives to force were published after the September 11 attacks. For a comprehensive explanation of the problems with Operation Enduring Freedom and its ineffectiveness in defeating the threat of Al Qaeda, as
well as an alternative approach, see CARL CONETTA, COMMONWEALTH
INSTITUTE PROJECT ON DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 6,
STRANGE VICTORY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
AND THE AFGHANISTAN WAR (Cambridge, MA, Jan. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.pdf.
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could increase their incentive to find, and try, peaceful options.153
E. Rethinking National Law to Limit Nations’ Resort to Force
A nation’s people are the ones who must fight, be killed and
maimed, and suffer from the wars initiated by their leaders, so
it is the people who must be persuaded to support a war. One
possibility of limiting the use of force thus rests with the people
of particular nations.154
Legally requiring national leaders to justify any conclusion
that force is necessary and to show how they will limit likely
harms and costs would be a giant step in limiting the recourse
to military force. Currently, these matters are not part of the
public discourse.155 Reformers, however, could propose a law,
entitled, “The Responsible Use of Military Force in International Affairs” (RUMFIA), codifying this idea and making it a
part of the public discourse. Politicians could rally around this
proposal as a way of protecting U.S. servicemen and women,

153. For a discussion of the role of the populace in determining the appropriateness of the use of force, see generally DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2002) (concluding that “national-level mechanisms” have been most
important in assuring democratic accountability of national and international
decisionmakers in deploying forces under NATO and UN authority) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY]. Public observation of the Security Council
deliberations in the run up to the U.S. war against Iraq earlier this year could
accelerate changes in Security Council practice. Brian J. Foley, Recent (Indecent) Exposures: Impact on International Law of U.S. Policies Toward Iraq
and North Korea, PROCEEDINGS, U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION 26 (Feb. 26 2003, sponsored by Center for Defense Information
and Physicians for Social Responsibility), available at http://www.lawyersagai
nstthewar.org/legalarticles/foleyexposure.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
154. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 153, at 65.
155. See Ruth Wedgewood, Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force:
The Doctrines of Necessity and Proportionality, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39,
58 (1992).
Proportionality and necessity have been segregated from American
public policy debate, cabined as technical military doctrines to be
handled by the war colleges and Pentagon staff. My claim here today
is that proportionality and necessity belong at the center of civilian
debate on the use of force in foreign affairs.
Id.
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citizens, and people in other countries,156 and of fostering international stability.
There may be popular support for such a measure. A large,
worldwide, antiwar movement sprang up in opposition to the
U.S. war against Iraq during its planning stages.157 Even if such
support could not succeed in passing RUMFIA, a movement’s
merely drafting it and campaigning for its adoption would focus
public attention on these issues. For example, most U.S. citizens are probably unaware of the extent of death and damage
caused by the 1991 Gulf War or the invasions of Afghanistan
and Iraq.158 As more accurate and timely information about the
actual effects of war becomes readily available, a movement to
ensure that the decision to use force includes consideration of
these harms could gain popular support.
The recent debate over whether to go to war against Iraq exemplifies the need for more national focus on alternatives to
war and the precise harms that could result from waging war.
At the end of July and the beginning of August 2002, the Senate
156. See id., at 59 (comments by Professor Ruth Wedgwood: “Strategic proportionality asks that civilian casualties be weighed against the justification
for using force in the first place.”).
157. Patrick E. Tyler, A New Power in the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, February 17,
2003, at A1.
158. For an example of the ideological sparring in the U.S. media concerning the numbers of civilians killed in U.S. military actions, see John Leo, The
Truth About Casualties, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 31, 2003, at 3 (expressing skepticism that the number of dead in Iraq would turn out as high as
initial reports: “In a number-obsessed society, focusing relentlessly on the
deaths of innocents — and inflating the numbers, if necessary — is a conventional way of undermining support for war.”). The corollary would appear to
obtain as well: underreporting the deaths of innocents is a conventional way of
creating and maintaining support for war. Regarding U.S. media coverage of
the war against Afghanistan, see Neil Hickey, A Time of Testing: Special Report, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 40 (calling Pentagon’s rules
limiting journalists as “toughest ever”); Michael Massing, Grief Without Portraits, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 6 (discussing lack of media reporting on
non-U.S. casualties of war); Patrick McCormick, See No Evil: While Movie
Wars are Raging on Screens Across the Nation, Uncle Sam has Managed to
Keep Both Media and Citizens in the Dark About the Ugly Reality of Our RealLife War on Terror, U.S. CATHOLIC, July 1, 2002, at 46. The failure of the media to highlight the horrors of war is by no means a new phenomenon, nor is it
limited to U.S. media, as the previous citations may appear to suggest. See
generally PHILLIP KNIGHTLY, THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT
AS HERO AND MYTH-MAKER FROM THE CRIMEA TO KOSOVO (2000).
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Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on the need for a
war against Iraq.159 These hearings, however, considered only a
few of the likely harms set forth above. There was little or no
focus on likely civilian casualties, casualties among conscripted
Iraqi soldiers, or human rights deprivations that could result in
other nations if their leaders supported the war against the
wishes of their populaces or insurgent factions.160 There was no
meaningful discussion of possible alternatives to the use of force
and violence.161 Finally, the Congressional debate that led to the
resolution allowing President Bush to use of force to invade Iraq
did not highlight these concerns.162
In addition, a movement to pass such a law could have a
beneficial effect on U.S. international relations. This movement, and any resulting law, could enhance American moral
authority, arguably the real source of power, whether national
or international.163
Likewise, people in other nations could seek to limit their
own governments’ use of force, and their own governments’
support for other nations’ military actions. For example, citizens of democratic nations, especially those on the Security
Council, could demand laws to prohibit their governments’ support for other nations’ military ventures unless the questions
set forth above in Section III164 or similar questions are answered satisfactorily.
These issues could also be aired through court challenges to
the national authority to wage war. For example, five weeks
before the U.S. and U.K. invaded Iraq in 2003, a motion for a
preliminary injunction was filed in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts by members of the House of Representatives, military personnel, parents of military personnel,
159. Hearings to Examine Threats, Responses, and Regional Consideration
Surrounding Iraq: Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong.
(2002), available at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/pdf/iraqhear.pdf.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Excerpts From Senate Debate on Iraq Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002,
at A20; The House Makes Its Decision: “Let Us Take This Stand Against Terror,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A14 (excerpts of floor speeches by Democrat
and Republican leaders).
163. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 8–9 (Oxford University Press, 2002) (using the term “soft power” for this type of authority).
164. See supra Parts III.A.4 and III.B.2.
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and others to stop President Bush from initiating war.165 The
court denied the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed, holding that it was beyond the court’s
powers to decide the issue at that time, because it was not clear
that there was any dispute between President Bush and Congress, or that either governmental branch had done or was
about to do anything in violation of their constitutional duties
or other laws.166 Similarly, in the U.K., the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament sued the British government in British
courts, arguing that the court should interpret UN Security
Council Resolution 1441 as not permitting the U.K. (or other
nations) to use force against Iraq, and as requiring an additional Security Council Resolution before force could be used.167
A court dismissed the suit on December 17, 2002, reasoning
that interpreting a Security Council resolution fell outside the
court’s jurisdiction.168 These lawsuits, despite failing, brought
increased attention to the issue of a government’s war-making
abilities and, in the long run, could play a part in forcing governments to use these powers in strict accordance with the law.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has been concerned with a very particular reform
to the international law on the use of force: developing it to
guide decisionmakers, prospectively, to find alternatives to
force, and to find ways to prevent or limit the harms that are
likely from a proposed use of force. The law on the use of force,
perhaps more than any other area of law, must provide prospective guidance, because harms caused by the use of military force
cannot be undone. Those killed cannot be “un-killed,” the dismembered cannot be “re-membered,” widows cannot be “unwidowed,” and orphans cannot be “un-orphaned”; indeed, there
are no such words in the English language. The use of force,
regardless of any noble intentions, causes severe harm and dis-

165. Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, reh’g. den., 322 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 137–41, 143–44.
167. BBC, CND Loses Fight Against War (Dec. 17, 2002), at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2583207.stm. The text of the briefs and the court opinion are available at http://www.cnduk.org/pages/campaign/legal.
tm.
168. Id.
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order. State-sponsored violence is thus a measure that must be
used sparingly, and with great discipline and restraint.
This Article poses questions for decisionmakers to consider
before permitting the use of force. These questions should improve the search for alternatives to force and guide decisionmakers to find solutions that avoid or limit the harms caused by
the use of force. At times, the answers to these questions may
lead to the conclusion that force is the best and most effective
option. Nevertheless it is hoped that such instances will be
rare, rarer than they are today. This Article also raises questions regarding the clarity of international law on the use of
force, and about the attitudes and rigor that decisionmakers
should bring to the task of determining whether to use force in
a given instance. This Article has answered these questions
normatively, by prescribing proposals for reform.
Beyond question is the fact that international law on the use
of force will not, on its own, develop into a tool for the sort of
guidance proposed in this Article. There is no enforcement
mechanism, and the emphasis of scholars on state practice and
custom will often make pronouncements on legality late-coming
and debatable, perhaps endlessly so. Moreover, those pronouncements may be ill-suited to prevent future uses of force,
because circumstances may differ, making any “precedent” inapplicable. Indeed, a nation that is entrepreneurial in the use
of force, and capable of using force without fear of suffering
damaging responses, can offer various justifications for using
force, each different from those that came before. International
law scholars would trail behind, trying to make sense of the destruction, to determine whether, after all, the action was legal,
while remaining impotent to prevent future damage or to influence state practice.
Thus, it is necessary to approach the law of war, and especially the jus ad bellum, proactively, with a reformer’s attitude.
International law is nascent, a work-in-progress. As such, the
opportunity exists for scholars not merely to describe state
practice but also to import the best ideas they can find from
other legal systems, or create themselves, to build a body of law
that is fair and sensible, and capable of preventing all but the
most necessary and limited uses of force. Future generations
will thank us.

